Caesar
15th Dec 08, 2:59 PM
Below is a brief paper I have been writing for publication about the friction between Hitler and his generals. It's half way done at the moment and is what I would call a 'first draft' document. I'm posting it here for comments as well as everyone's reading enjoyment (hopefully). The bibliography is in an uncompleted state at the moment as well.
Dating back to the Kaiserreich, German generals jealously guarded their traditional claim to have complete say in any matter of state that found itself involved in matters of military planning and execution. Following the successful invasion of Poland, the German generals had composed a large memoranda addressed to Hitler himself. Prompted by Hitler’s obsessive meddling in the affairs of the planning of the invasion of Poland. The generals had united in their opposition to his meddling and thus composed a memorandum recommending that Hitler not launch an attack against the West during the coming spring months (Clark 1965, 2). These generals pressed Commander in Chief of the Army General Walther von Brauchitsch into personally delivering their memoranda to the Führer himself. The nervous von Brauchitsch was received by Hitler in the Chancellery where he read the ill-organized note from his colleagues. Hitler flew into a rage and accused von Brauchitsch, as well as the entire General Staff, of “disloyalty, sabotage, cowardice, and defeatism” (Clark 1965, 4). This wasn’t the last time that von Brauchitsch would be verbally assaulted by the Führer. Nor was he the last general to be abused by Hitler’s rage and scathing remarks. Others would assume the mantle of Hitler’s whipping boy over the next five years of world war. Hitler’s willpower and the desire of the General Staff officers for military expediency were to clash many, many more times regarding the very same points that von Brauchitsch and his colleagues sought to bring to Hitler’s attention after the invasion of Poland.
Against the wishes of his generals, Hitler launched offensive operations against the Low Countries, France, and Great Britain during the spring of 1940. Hitler’s meddling in military operations was at a minimum during the fall of France right up until the famous stop order issued at Dunkirk (Manstein 1982, 266). According to von Rundstedt, Hitler “listened to interpretation of operational matters…he did not attempt direct intervention except in outstanding circumstances” (Manstein 1982, 273). This would change in a dramatic fashion during the late summer of 1941 when Germany launched Operation Barbarossa—the largest and bloodiest land battle ever fought in the history of warfare. The first signs of trouble began when the date for the beginning of the invasion was postponed. Then, the distribution of winter clothing for the troops and suitable lubricants for armored vehicles was forbidden by Hitler early on in the campaign when they still could have reached front line troops in time to be meaningful. The protests of Army Group commanders such as General Heinz Guderian were never forwarded to Hitler (Guderian 2002, 267).
Despite the incredible early gains made by the German army, the offensive bogged down in the mud and snow outside the gates of Moscow. Soviet reinforcements from the Far East began to arrive behind Moscow in preparation for a counterattack masterminded by the famous Marshall Zhukov. With several Germany army corps in a precarious position and their heavy weapons at the mercy of their extended supply lines and the cold Russian mud and snow, Hitler ordered every soldier to dig in where he stood and hold “every square yard of land!” (Guderian 2002, 265). General Guderian, then commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, had already ordered the withdrawal of his forces to more permanent fortifications after conferring with Chief of Staff von Brauchitsch earlier. Hitler countermanded all withdrawal orders as was his right as the self-appointed Supreme Commander of the Army. Guderian, the responsible general he was, arranged an audience with Hitler personally at Rastenberg Airfield.
“Little monk, little monk, you are taking a hard road!” Frundsberg uttered these words to Martin Luther before the first Diet of Worms in 1521—and so Guderian’s staff officers quoted these words to him as he was preparing to leave to confer with Hitler (Guderian 2002, 264). During these days, Guderian, as well as many other prominent German officers, still “…believed that our supreme command would listen to sensible propositions…by a general who knew the front” (Guderian 2002). Guderian, as others in the future, was soon to find out how wrong he had been.
On the 20th of December 1941, Guderian arrived at Rastenberg Airfield and met with Hitler for five hours. Despite the fact that the Army High Command, and not the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces was in charge of the Eastern Front, Guderian found that no representative of the High Command was present (Guderian 2002, 265). He was to be alone to try and sway Hitler over to his side. Guderian, who had met Hitler before on several occasions and had believed himself to be on amiable terms with the Führer, noticed that as Hitler greeted him he had a “…hard unfriendly expression in his eyes…” (Guderian 2002, 266). After hours of attempting to bring Hitler over to his way of thinking, Guderian was still forbidden by Hitler to allow any troop withdrawals despite the ground being unsuitable for Hitler’s order to “dig in.” Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Army was to stay put in the face of Soviet numerical superiority and the terrible conditions on the front line. According to Guderian, the only positive action to come from the meeting with Hitler was the gift of two field stoves from the Armaments Minister Dr. Todt.
Days later, after returning to the front, the Soviets counterattacked in force and pushed several divisions under Guderian’s command back. After a heated argument with Guderian’s superior, von Kleist, over the withdrawal of his troops in the face of the Soviet attack, Guderian was sacked from command of the 2nd Panzer Army and removed to the reserve pool of officers (Guderian 2002, 270).
In spite of Hitler’s suicidal orders, German units were able to weather the Soviet counter-offensive and eventually made preparations for more offensive in the spring and dumme rof 1942. Months after Guderian’s sacking as the commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, Erich von Manstein was appointed as commander of Army Group Don which was stationed on the Southern wing of the German front lines in the Soviet Union. Manstein, who was well known for his modification of the Schlieffen Plan, had not yet known Hitler’s influence on military decisions making directly until this point in his career (Manstein 1982, 273). He was to learn quickly on the job.
Bibliography
Beevor, Antony. Stalingrad. Penguin Books, 1999.
—. The Fall of Berlin 1945. Penguin Books, 2003.
Clark, Alan. Barbarossa The Russian-German Conflict 1941-45. New York: Morrow, 1965.
Guderian, General Heinz. Panzer Leader. New York: Da Capo Press, 2002.
Manstein, Field Marshall Erich von. Lost Victories. Munich: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1982.
Dating back to the Kaiserreich, German generals jealously guarded their traditional claim to have complete say in any matter of state that found itself involved in matters of military planning and execution. Following the successful invasion of Poland, the German generals had composed a large memoranda addressed to Hitler himself. Prompted by Hitler’s obsessive meddling in the affairs of the planning of the invasion of Poland. The generals had united in their opposition to his meddling and thus composed a memorandum recommending that Hitler not launch an attack against the West during the coming spring months (Clark 1965, 2). These generals pressed Commander in Chief of the Army General Walther von Brauchitsch into personally delivering their memoranda to the Führer himself. The nervous von Brauchitsch was received by Hitler in the Chancellery where he read the ill-organized note from his colleagues. Hitler flew into a rage and accused von Brauchitsch, as well as the entire General Staff, of “disloyalty, sabotage, cowardice, and defeatism” (Clark 1965, 4). This wasn’t the last time that von Brauchitsch would be verbally assaulted by the Führer. Nor was he the last general to be abused by Hitler’s rage and scathing remarks. Others would assume the mantle of Hitler’s whipping boy over the next five years of world war. Hitler’s willpower and the desire of the General Staff officers for military expediency were to clash many, many more times regarding the very same points that von Brauchitsch and his colleagues sought to bring to Hitler’s attention after the invasion of Poland.
Against the wishes of his generals, Hitler launched offensive operations against the Low Countries, France, and Great Britain during the spring of 1940. Hitler’s meddling in military operations was at a minimum during the fall of France right up until the famous stop order issued at Dunkirk (Manstein 1982, 266). According to von Rundstedt, Hitler “listened to interpretation of operational matters…he did not attempt direct intervention except in outstanding circumstances” (Manstein 1982, 273). This would change in a dramatic fashion during the late summer of 1941 when Germany launched Operation Barbarossa—the largest and bloodiest land battle ever fought in the history of warfare. The first signs of trouble began when the date for the beginning of the invasion was postponed. Then, the distribution of winter clothing for the troops and suitable lubricants for armored vehicles was forbidden by Hitler early on in the campaign when they still could have reached front line troops in time to be meaningful. The protests of Army Group commanders such as General Heinz Guderian were never forwarded to Hitler (Guderian 2002, 267).
Despite the incredible early gains made by the German army, the offensive bogged down in the mud and snow outside the gates of Moscow. Soviet reinforcements from the Far East began to arrive behind Moscow in preparation for a counterattack masterminded by the famous Marshall Zhukov. With several Germany army corps in a precarious position and their heavy weapons at the mercy of their extended supply lines and the cold Russian mud and snow, Hitler ordered every soldier to dig in where he stood and hold “every square yard of land!” (Guderian 2002, 265). General Guderian, then commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, had already ordered the withdrawal of his forces to more permanent fortifications after conferring with Chief of Staff von Brauchitsch earlier. Hitler countermanded all withdrawal orders as was his right as the self-appointed Supreme Commander of the Army. Guderian, the responsible general he was, arranged an audience with Hitler personally at Rastenberg Airfield.
“Little monk, little monk, you are taking a hard road!” Frundsberg uttered these words to Martin Luther before the first Diet of Worms in 1521—and so Guderian’s staff officers quoted these words to him as he was preparing to leave to confer with Hitler (Guderian 2002, 264). During these days, Guderian, as well as many other prominent German officers, still “…believed that our supreme command would listen to sensible propositions…by a general who knew the front” (Guderian 2002). Guderian, as others in the future, was soon to find out how wrong he had been.
On the 20th of December 1941, Guderian arrived at Rastenberg Airfield and met with Hitler for five hours. Despite the fact that the Army High Command, and not the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces was in charge of the Eastern Front, Guderian found that no representative of the High Command was present (Guderian 2002, 265). He was to be alone to try and sway Hitler over to his side. Guderian, who had met Hitler before on several occasions and had believed himself to be on amiable terms with the Führer, noticed that as Hitler greeted him he had a “…hard unfriendly expression in his eyes…” (Guderian 2002, 266). After hours of attempting to bring Hitler over to his way of thinking, Guderian was still forbidden by Hitler to allow any troop withdrawals despite the ground being unsuitable for Hitler’s order to “dig in.” Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Army was to stay put in the face of Soviet numerical superiority and the terrible conditions on the front line. According to Guderian, the only positive action to come from the meeting with Hitler was the gift of two field stoves from the Armaments Minister Dr. Todt.
Days later, after returning to the front, the Soviets counterattacked in force and pushed several divisions under Guderian’s command back. After a heated argument with Guderian’s superior, von Kleist, over the withdrawal of his troops in the face of the Soviet attack, Guderian was sacked from command of the 2nd Panzer Army and removed to the reserve pool of officers (Guderian 2002, 270).
In spite of Hitler’s suicidal orders, German units were able to weather the Soviet counter-offensive and eventually made preparations for more offensive in the spring and dumme rof 1942. Months after Guderian’s sacking as the commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, Erich von Manstein was appointed as commander of Army Group Don which was stationed on the Southern wing of the German front lines in the Soviet Union. Manstein, who was well known for his modification of the Schlieffen Plan, had not yet known Hitler’s influence on military decisions making directly until this point in his career (Manstein 1982, 273). He was to learn quickly on the job.
Bibliography
Beevor, Antony. Stalingrad. Penguin Books, 1999.
—. The Fall of Berlin 1945. Penguin Books, 2003.
Clark, Alan. Barbarossa The Russian-German Conflict 1941-45. New York: Morrow, 1965.
Guderian, General Heinz. Panzer Leader. New York: Da Capo Press, 2002.
Manstein, Field Marshall Erich von. Lost Victories. Munich: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1982.